Again With Armor
I posted a few days ago, briefly, about the public relations problems posed by reservists. Ralph Kinney Bennett at Tech Central Station writes a great piece about the misconceptions people have about equipment being the savior of our boys in Iraq. He makes several excellent points. One is that no matter how much armor you put on a soldier (or vehicle), that serves merely as a challenge for the enemy to rise up to.
Bennett also notes, as I touched on, that most of the casualties in Iraq aren't people on patrol, but service and support personnel. These people tend to be reservists, as combat specialists tend to be active duty members. Because reservists sign up for such duties as administration, or water purification, they don't tend to develop as disciplined an attitude as active duty folks. It's that disciplined attitude, gentle reader, that vigilance and paranoia, that keeps men alive; not an extra inch of steel that weighs down the vehicle. In fact, I've read the account of at least one soldier who notes that he and his unit conducted their patrols in HMMWV's with no doors, because this made it easier for them to carry out their mission; he said that the increased armor (which weighs around two thousand pounds and cuts the driver/rider's field of vision) was detrimental to the mission of their patrols.
When our troops rely on armor, instead of good warfighting doctrine, to keep them safe, they make themselves more vulnerable by turning off their instincts and alertness. That's what's killing people; not a lack of armor.
In fact, the HMMWV isn't intended for armored combat; it's a utility vehicle. The U.S. Army's operations are based around the following vehicles. For armored combat and infantry support, the M1-A1/A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank; for infantry and cavalry transport and support, the M2/M3 Bradley Infantry/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle; for light armored combat, and the LAV/Stryker Light Armored Vehicle; the Marine Corps also utilizes the Assault Amphibian Vehicle Personnel ("AAV") for landing and infantry support operations. For light tactical utility and command and control, the Army and Marine Corps use the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or HMMWV, or "Humvee"/"Hummer." The HMMWV is not an infantry fighting vehicle, nor is it a light armored vehicle; it's a utility vehicle. Adding two thousand pounds of armor to it drastically reduces its ability to perform the mission it was designed for.
Basically, we're faced with a choice. We can employ these equipment assets in the missions they were designed for, using them to complement each other; or we can try to change them when the real problem is undisciplined personnel. I'm just a simple student, but I'd be willing to bet money that encouraging a higher degree of discipline and convoy alertness and aggressiveness in personnel, particularly the aforementioned rear eschelon Reserve and National Guard elements, would go a lot further and have more benefits beyond combat survivability than spending four billion dollars to put armor on a bunch of vehicles that weren't designed to carry it.
Bennett also notes, as I touched on, that most of the casualties in Iraq aren't people on patrol, but service and support personnel. These people tend to be reservists, as combat specialists tend to be active duty members. Because reservists sign up for such duties as administration, or water purification, they don't tend to develop as disciplined an attitude as active duty folks. It's that disciplined attitude, gentle reader, that vigilance and paranoia, that keeps men alive; not an extra inch of steel that weighs down the vehicle. In fact, I've read the account of at least one soldier who notes that he and his unit conducted their patrols in HMMWV's with no doors, because this made it easier for them to carry out their mission; he said that the increased armor (which weighs around two thousand pounds and cuts the driver/rider's field of vision) was detrimental to the mission of their patrols.
When our troops rely on armor, instead of good warfighting doctrine, to keep them safe, they make themselves more vulnerable by turning off their instincts and alertness. That's what's killing people; not a lack of armor.
In fact, the HMMWV isn't intended for armored combat; it's a utility vehicle. The U.S. Army's operations are based around the following vehicles. For armored combat and infantry support, the M1-A1/A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank; for infantry and cavalry transport and support, the M2/M3 Bradley Infantry/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle; for light armored combat, and the LAV/Stryker Light Armored Vehicle; the Marine Corps also utilizes the Assault Amphibian Vehicle Personnel ("AAV") for landing and infantry support operations. For light tactical utility and command and control, the Army and Marine Corps use the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or HMMWV, or "Humvee"/"Hummer." The HMMWV is not an infantry fighting vehicle, nor is it a light armored vehicle; it's a utility vehicle. Adding two thousand pounds of armor to it drastically reduces its ability to perform the mission it was designed for.
Basically, we're faced with a choice. We can employ these equipment assets in the missions they were designed for, using them to complement each other; or we can try to change them when the real problem is undisciplined personnel. I'm just a simple student, but I'd be willing to bet money that encouraging a higher degree of discipline and convoy alertness and aggressiveness in personnel, particularly the aforementioned rear eschelon Reserve and National Guard elements, would go a lot further and have more benefits beyond combat survivability than spending four billion dollars to put armor on a bunch of vehicles that weren't designed to carry it.
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