Dissecting the Hamas Win
Okay. This is probably going to be a bit disjointed, but I'm sure all of it will be very relevant and serious and such. Before I do that, I'll post links to several of the many hard news articles on the subject.
BBC News
CNN
Fox News
Everyone should also have a look at this page, just for review. It's certainly not a neutral account, but I'm fairly sure that it's factually accurate. In order to save me some time and grief, I'm going to, for this one post, dispense with the quotation marks around the word "Palestinian"; I just want to make it clear that as far as I'm concerned, "Palestine" is a region, it has never been a nation, and there is no such thing as a "Palestinian" person. However, the state of politics in the Levant and the world at large has led to the creation of a de facto population group who feels that they're owed a particular piece of real estate. Whether they're owed it, or deserve it, or whatever, the only discernible solution to the massive debacle that is the Middle East, if one exists at all, will require a two independent states: the restored, ancient nation of Israel, and a brand new nation called "Palestine", populated by a brand new population group with a purely artificial, synthetic national identity.
Okay, let's get down to the details. First thing's first: what happened, and why? Now, I'm not going to get into the ridiculous farce that is the parliamentary system; if you don't know how a parliamentary system works, read this. I'm going to focus on the actual causation.
Why did Hamas win? I can basically sum it up in seven words: this is the legacy of Yasser Arafat. It's no secret that Yasser Arafat was one of the wealthiest men in the world when he died, having funneled literal billions of dollars in international aid into his own coffers. Arafat's Fatah party, which has been the ruling party among the Palestinians for many years now, is seen (accurately) as being corrupt. They have made promises to improve infrastructure, they have made promises to deliver numerous improvements; instead, much of their constituency sits unemployed, uneducated, and bored in refugee camps. They now have territory, they had elections last year, and very little seems to change; the Palestinian territories are lawless, Fatah has been unable to provide security or disarm the militias. To the average Palestinian on the street, or in the refugee camp, Fatah's had its chance.
And what about Hamas? Well, political parties in Palestine are linked to terrorist militias. Fatah is "linked" to the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Hamas is a two part entity: half political party, half terrorist militia. While the "militia" is busy strapping bomb belts and vests to themselves and blowing up pizzerias, coffee houses, and buses full of children and pensioners in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the "political party" is providing social services and welfare benefits to some Palestinians. Now, the source of the funds and supplies used in such endeavours may be questionable in their origin, but to the average Palestinian, Fatah hasn't accomplished much, while Hamas is providing for some of the people. Aside from that, as Father Time noted in an E-Mail to me this morning, Hamas also boasts, illegitimately, that it was their efforts, their terrorist bombings, their attacks, that caused Israel to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip; but, like I said, this result is a part of the Yasser Arafat legacy.
So, for better or worse, those are some of the likely reasons for the overwhelming Hamas victory, assuming of course that it was legitimate in the first place. It's also worth noting that we should avoid international snobbery in this situation. Those of you who voted for President Bush in 2004, do you remember how asinine it was when that British newspaper (either the Guardian or the Daily Telegraph, probably the former) asked how so many Americans could be so stupid? It didn't serve any purpose then, and it doesn't serve any purpose now. We may disagree with the way the election went, we may even believe that it might have gone differently had the Palestinian electorate had additional or alternative information; but the fact of the matter is that the Palestinian electorate voted Hamas in, and they had reasons for doing so.
And what about the character of Hamas? Hamas' entire mission, their entire reason for existence, is the destruction of Israel and the Israeli people. They're Islamists, they're anti-Israeli, and they show it by carrying out terrorist bombings on Israeli soil. Their armed militia wing (which would be similar to the Democratic or Republican parties having their own private armies) exists for two reasons: as bodyguards for the Hamas leadership, and as anti-Israeli shock troops. As you can imagine, the Israelis aren't exactly heralding the Hamas election as a positive step forward in the peace process, and they're refusing to work with a government headed by Hamas, just like they refused to work with a government headed by Yasser Arafat. Israel, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations are approaching the situation with essentially the same position: no diplomatic relations can exist between those entities and an organization whose entire platform demands the destruction and dissolution of a sovereign nation.
The next thing we need to consider is what the Palestinians stand to lose as a result of the Hamas electoral win. First and foremost, they could, and will, lose hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in economic aid from various sources. Hamas is a long-standing recipient of the U.S. State Department's "Foreign Terrorist Organization" designation, as you can see here; you can also see on that page that providing material support to an FTO is illegal under federal law. Similar laws exist for the European Union and the United Nations, though you can probably count on the U.N. to find some way to circumvent such regulations. Financially speaking, the bottom line is that the Hamas win will cause incoming economic aid from the international community to dry up pretty much instantly.
In addition, considering that Hamas had no diplomatic capital to begin with, the vast majority of official Palestinian diplomatic capital is now moot. There's some degree of legitimacy as long as President Mahmoud Abbas remains in office; how long that's going to last is anyone's guess, as Abbas has already expressed reservations about the new situatio. Basically, the diplomatic situation is probably worse than it was when Yasser Arafat was alive; at least Arafat went through the motions of negotiating with Israel. Hamas is likely to find themselves in a less advantageous position than Arafat was in, and if you'll remember, Arafat was blockaded inside his compound in Ramallah until he got sick and was airlifted to that hospital in Paris.
What do the Palestinians have to gain from this? Honestly, I can't figure anything out. It's likely that many Palestinians thought that anyone would be more effective than the Fatah party. Unfortunately, Hamas may have had enough money through questionable sources when they were a rebel group to provide social services for a limited amount of individuals. The amount of constituents expecting that assistance from Hamas just skyrocketed, and any money they would have used to make that happen simultaneously evaporated. If it was next to impossible to get improvements in infrastructure under Fatah, it's going to be completely impossible to get it under Hamas. Some might consider it advantageous that Hamas will be more aggressive with Israel than Fatah was; unfortunately for the Palestinians, we all known that being aggressive against Israel doesn't really make any progress. Harassing Israel is counter-productive.
So, what does this mean for Israel? A Hamas victory in the parliamentary election was a de facto declaration of war against Israel by the Palestinian people. Israel isn't likely to make preemptive strikes; however, Israel has nothing to lose anymore by holding back when it comes to retaliation. Now, whenever someone representing Hamas, officially or unofficially, detonates a bomb vest or belt or a car bomb or whatever, that will represent an official act of war against Israel by the governing party. Israel will be completely within its rights when it answers a Hamas car bombing, or small arms attack, or what have you, with an air strike by Apache helicopters. As for diplomacy, as I mentioned earlier, things are essentially back to square one, just as they were before Yasser Arafat got sick.
What about for the United States? All economic aid to the Palestinian government has to be cut off; it's the law, and aside from that, it would be counter-productive and a public relations joke to be fighting a war against terrorism while supporting the newest state sponsor of terrorism. That's right, folks: the Palestinians have joined the Iranians and the North Koreans, unless Hamas changes its tune, renounces terrorism, disarms its terrorist militias, and publically acknowledges Israel's right to exist, Palestine is a terrorist state. Muammar Qaddafi's all but sold his soul to get Libya off that list; it will be interesting to see how Hamas reacts. Either way, American policy is pretty clear, through both federal law and administrative precedent.
There have been statements, on this blog and elsewhere, that the Hamas victory will lead to a war. Some have even predicted that it will happen within about a month and a half. I'll be honest, I don't see it. I can see a possible escalation in terrorist violence, and an increase in the Israeli response; but let's review, honestly. Arabs have fought three wars against Israel since 1948, and in each and every conflict they've had their asses handed to them, and lost territory in the process. The original Arab-Israeli War of 1948 involved Israel against Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and various Arab irregulars. Of those, Israel now has treaties and civil relations with Egypt and Jordan. Yemen and Lebanon are essentially in no position to attack, and the Iraqis and the Saudis aren't going to sign onboard for various reasons. Of the nations that were still willing to give things a go in 1973, Syria and Egypt, only Syria is still hell bent for Israel's destruction, and Israel's got better gear and better troops than the Syrians. Since the Syrians have very little to gain, and very little chance of gaining it, it's highly unlikely that they'd get involved.
When you couple that with the fact that the Palestinian security forces are armed with small arms, rocket propelled grenades, and not much else, and then compare that to Israel's top notch air force, ground forces, and intelligence agencies, it's not in Hamas' best interest to start a bona fide war with Israel; the only area in which they have even moderate chances of success is unconventional, asymmetrical warfare (terrorism and guerilla tactics); so my prediction is that if there's any escalation of hostilities, that's the way that Hamas will do it, and the Israelis will be less encumbered politically against decisive counterattacks than they were previously.
On a side note, it was suggested to me at some point, possibly by a co-worker, that this could lead to an Iranian attack on Israel. I don't see that at this point, either, for several reasons. First, if you'll remember, analysts have been considering the fact that the Israelis would be at the very edge of their capacity if they were to attempt air strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. You don't have to be a seasoned intelligence analyst to know that the Iranian air force is nowhere near as sophisticated as that of the Israelis; so, assuming the Iranians could get a plane to Israel in the first place, the Israelis would likely make short work of them. Therefore, a conventional attack would be unlikely. Also, it's doubtful that the Iranians have a nuclear weapon at this point in time.
Of course, only time will tell. Anyway, those are my thoughts; better late than never, eh?
Everyone should also have a look at this page, just for review. It's certainly not a neutral account, but I'm fairly sure that it's factually accurate. In order to save me some time and grief, I'm going to, for this one post, dispense with the quotation marks around the word "Palestinian"; I just want to make it clear that as far as I'm concerned, "Palestine" is a region, it has never been a nation, and there is no such thing as a "Palestinian" person. However, the state of politics in the Levant and the world at large has led to the creation of a de facto population group who feels that they're owed a particular piece of real estate. Whether they're owed it, or deserve it, or whatever, the only discernible solution to the massive debacle that is the Middle East, if one exists at all, will require a two independent states: the restored, ancient nation of Israel, and a brand new nation called "Palestine", populated by a brand new population group with a purely artificial, synthetic national identity.
Okay, let's get down to the details. First thing's first: what happened, and why? Now, I'm not going to get into the ridiculous farce that is the parliamentary system; if you don't know how a parliamentary system works, read this. I'm going to focus on the actual causation.
Why did Hamas win? I can basically sum it up in seven words: this is the legacy of Yasser Arafat. It's no secret that Yasser Arafat was one of the wealthiest men in the world when he died, having funneled literal billions of dollars in international aid into his own coffers. Arafat's Fatah party, which has been the ruling party among the Palestinians for many years now, is seen (accurately) as being corrupt. They have made promises to improve infrastructure, they have made promises to deliver numerous improvements; instead, much of their constituency sits unemployed, uneducated, and bored in refugee camps. They now have territory, they had elections last year, and very little seems to change; the Palestinian territories are lawless, Fatah has been unable to provide security or disarm the militias. To the average Palestinian on the street, or in the refugee camp, Fatah's had its chance.
And what about Hamas? Well, political parties in Palestine are linked to terrorist militias. Fatah is "linked" to the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Hamas is a two part entity: half political party, half terrorist militia. While the "militia" is busy strapping bomb belts and vests to themselves and blowing up pizzerias, coffee houses, and buses full of children and pensioners in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the "political party" is providing social services and welfare benefits to some Palestinians. Now, the source of the funds and supplies used in such endeavours may be questionable in their origin, but to the average Palestinian, Fatah hasn't accomplished much, while Hamas is providing for some of the people. Aside from that, as Father Time noted in an E-Mail to me this morning, Hamas also boasts, illegitimately, that it was their efforts, their terrorist bombings, their attacks, that caused Israel to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip; but, like I said, this result is a part of the Yasser Arafat legacy.
So, for better or worse, those are some of the likely reasons for the overwhelming Hamas victory, assuming of course that it was legitimate in the first place. It's also worth noting that we should avoid international snobbery in this situation. Those of you who voted for President Bush in 2004, do you remember how asinine it was when that British newspaper (either the Guardian or the Daily Telegraph, probably the former) asked how so many Americans could be so stupid? It didn't serve any purpose then, and it doesn't serve any purpose now. We may disagree with the way the election went, we may even believe that it might have gone differently had the Palestinian electorate had additional or alternative information; but the fact of the matter is that the Palestinian electorate voted Hamas in, and they had reasons for doing so.
And what about the character of Hamas? Hamas' entire mission, their entire reason for existence, is the destruction of Israel and the Israeli people. They're Islamists, they're anti-Israeli, and they show it by carrying out terrorist bombings on Israeli soil. Their armed militia wing (which would be similar to the Democratic or Republican parties having their own private armies) exists for two reasons: as bodyguards for the Hamas leadership, and as anti-Israeli shock troops. As you can imagine, the Israelis aren't exactly heralding the Hamas election as a positive step forward in the peace process, and they're refusing to work with a government headed by Hamas, just like they refused to work with a government headed by Yasser Arafat. Israel, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations are approaching the situation with essentially the same position: no diplomatic relations can exist between those entities and an organization whose entire platform demands the destruction and dissolution of a sovereign nation.
The next thing we need to consider is what the Palestinians stand to lose as a result of the Hamas electoral win. First and foremost, they could, and will, lose hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in economic aid from various sources. Hamas is a long-standing recipient of the U.S. State Department's "Foreign Terrorist Organization" designation, as you can see here; you can also see on that page that providing material support to an FTO is illegal under federal law. Similar laws exist for the European Union and the United Nations, though you can probably count on the U.N. to find some way to circumvent such regulations. Financially speaking, the bottom line is that the Hamas win will cause incoming economic aid from the international community to dry up pretty much instantly.
In addition, considering that Hamas had no diplomatic capital to begin with, the vast majority of official Palestinian diplomatic capital is now moot. There's some degree of legitimacy as long as President Mahmoud Abbas remains in office; how long that's going to last is anyone's guess, as Abbas has already expressed reservations about the new situatio. Basically, the diplomatic situation is probably worse than it was when Yasser Arafat was alive; at least Arafat went through the motions of negotiating with Israel. Hamas is likely to find themselves in a less advantageous position than Arafat was in, and if you'll remember, Arafat was blockaded inside his compound in Ramallah until he got sick and was airlifted to that hospital in Paris.
What do the Palestinians have to gain from this? Honestly, I can't figure anything out. It's likely that many Palestinians thought that anyone would be more effective than the Fatah party. Unfortunately, Hamas may have had enough money through questionable sources when they were a rebel group to provide social services for a limited amount of individuals. The amount of constituents expecting that assistance from Hamas just skyrocketed, and any money they would have used to make that happen simultaneously evaporated. If it was next to impossible to get improvements in infrastructure under Fatah, it's going to be completely impossible to get it under Hamas. Some might consider it advantageous that Hamas will be more aggressive with Israel than Fatah was; unfortunately for the Palestinians, we all known that being aggressive against Israel doesn't really make any progress. Harassing Israel is counter-productive.
So, what does this mean for Israel? A Hamas victory in the parliamentary election was a de facto declaration of war against Israel by the Palestinian people. Israel isn't likely to make preemptive strikes; however, Israel has nothing to lose anymore by holding back when it comes to retaliation. Now, whenever someone representing Hamas, officially or unofficially, detonates a bomb vest or belt or a car bomb or whatever, that will represent an official act of war against Israel by the governing party. Israel will be completely within its rights when it answers a Hamas car bombing, or small arms attack, or what have you, with an air strike by Apache helicopters. As for diplomacy, as I mentioned earlier, things are essentially back to square one, just as they were before Yasser Arafat got sick.
What about for the United States? All economic aid to the Palestinian government has to be cut off; it's the law, and aside from that, it would be counter-productive and a public relations joke to be fighting a war against terrorism while supporting the newest state sponsor of terrorism. That's right, folks: the Palestinians have joined the Iranians and the North Koreans, unless Hamas changes its tune, renounces terrorism, disarms its terrorist militias, and publically acknowledges Israel's right to exist, Palestine is a terrorist state. Muammar Qaddafi's all but sold his soul to get Libya off that list; it will be interesting to see how Hamas reacts. Either way, American policy is pretty clear, through both federal law and administrative precedent.
There have been statements, on this blog and elsewhere, that the Hamas victory will lead to a war. Some have even predicted that it will happen within about a month and a half. I'll be honest, I don't see it. I can see a possible escalation in terrorist violence, and an increase in the Israeli response; but let's review, honestly. Arabs have fought three wars against Israel since 1948, and in each and every conflict they've had their asses handed to them, and lost territory in the process. The original Arab-Israeli War of 1948 involved Israel against Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and various Arab irregulars. Of those, Israel now has treaties and civil relations with Egypt and Jordan. Yemen and Lebanon are essentially in no position to attack, and the Iraqis and the Saudis aren't going to sign onboard for various reasons. Of the nations that were still willing to give things a go in 1973, Syria and Egypt, only Syria is still hell bent for Israel's destruction, and Israel's got better gear and better troops than the Syrians. Since the Syrians have very little to gain, and very little chance of gaining it, it's highly unlikely that they'd get involved.
When you couple that with the fact that the Palestinian security forces are armed with small arms, rocket propelled grenades, and not much else, and then compare that to Israel's top notch air force, ground forces, and intelligence agencies, it's not in Hamas' best interest to start a bona fide war with Israel; the only area in which they have even moderate chances of success is unconventional, asymmetrical warfare (terrorism and guerilla tactics); so my prediction is that if there's any escalation of hostilities, that's the way that Hamas will do it, and the Israelis will be less encumbered politically against decisive counterattacks than they were previously.
On a side note, it was suggested to me at some point, possibly by a co-worker, that this could lead to an Iranian attack on Israel. I don't see that at this point, either, for several reasons. First, if you'll remember, analysts have been considering the fact that the Israelis would be at the very edge of their capacity if they were to attempt air strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. You don't have to be a seasoned intelligence analyst to know that the Iranian air force is nowhere near as sophisticated as that of the Israelis; so, assuming the Iranians could get a plane to Israel in the first place, the Israelis would likely make short work of them. Therefore, a conventional attack would be unlikely. Also, it's doubtful that the Iranians have a nuclear weapon at this point in time.
Of course, only time will tell. Anyway, those are my thoughts; better late than never, eh?
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