Forging Jihadi Alliances
This is a long-awaited update on some recent al Qaeda public relations activity.
Following up on this post, it appears that Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya militant group isn't affiliating with al Qaeda after all; even the BBC reported it. It's tough to tell who's telling the truth, or whether the truth is somewhere in between. There are a few possibilities.
The two groups have affiliated with each other, but Gemaa Islamiya doesn't want to be publically associated with al Qaeda; this makes al Qaeda look bad, as it's a sign or perceived weakness among the Islamist community.
al Qaeda has affiliated with a splinter group of militants who have broken away from Gemaa Islamiya. The articles say that Gemaa Islamiya renounced violence in the recent future, so it's possible that the alliance is between al Qaeda and militant remnants that have broken away from the mainstream group. If this is the case, it doesn't do al Qaeda much credit.
There is no alliance; this makes al Qaeda look like Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, better known as "Baghdad Bob".
It appears, however, that al Qaeda followed this up with an actual alliance to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, an Algerian Salafist group dedicated to attacks against Western interests. The Algerian group derives from the GIA, a group whose stated goal is the overthrow of the Algerian government and the establishment of an Islamic Algerian state.
Roughly two weeks after al Qaeda made this announcement, near-simultaneous car bombs were detonated by Algerian terrorists. While the original article on CNN (linked here, in the unlikely event that it returns) gives no indication as to the identity of the responsible parties, the GIA is the most likely suspect.
All of this information begs the question: what's in it for al Qaeda, and what does this mean for the overall campaign against Islamist terrorism? al Qaeda's in tough shape overall. For all of their supposed successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in spite of a report from the New York Times (the most objective, honest, and authoritative information source on terrorism available) that the Iraqi insurgency is financially self-sustaining, al Qaeda is in tough shape. They no longer have freedom of movement or communication; the assets of the central organization have been frozen, confiscated, or compromised; and their upper-eschelon leaders keep getting captured (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Farraj al-Libbi, Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, Abu Nasir al-Qahtani) or killed (Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basayev, Omar al-Farouq). Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, while still on the run, have no freedom of movement. These are just a few examples.
For those of you who don't know, al Qaeda operates as a loose affiliation of like-minded international Islamist terrorist groups. Instead of operating as a highly centralized organization, al Qaeda maintains a decentralized leadership and logistical footprint; as a result, capturing one leader or eliminating one cell won't have a critical impact on the organization as a whole. Coalition forces have eliminated and paralyzed numerous cells and captured or killed numerous individuals. In short, al Qaeda is in trouble, and when a loosely affiliated group of terrorist cells and regionally-based militant organizations hits trouble, the natural recourse is to bring new groups into the fold.
Essentially, there are two possibilities. Either al Qaeda is gaining strength, and they're looking to pass that strength on to the little guys by offering the core group's assistance to regional militant groups like Gemaa Islamiyah and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat; or, more likely, al Qaeda is hemorrhaging membership and resources, and they're doing whatever they can to hold out longer than the forces of Western Civilization.
The more likely case is the latter, but prudent strategic planning requires fighting as if it's the former. The important take-away is that we must continue to do what I've encouraged you readers to do for a long time now: be aware.
Following up on this post, it appears that Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya militant group isn't affiliating with al Qaeda after all; even the BBC reported it. It's tough to tell who's telling the truth, or whether the truth is somewhere in between. There are a few possibilities.
It appears, however, that al Qaeda followed this up with an actual alliance to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, an Algerian Salafist group dedicated to attacks against Western interests. The Algerian group derives from the GIA, a group whose stated goal is the overthrow of the Algerian government and the establishment of an Islamic Algerian state.
Roughly two weeks after al Qaeda made this announcement, near-simultaneous car bombs were detonated by Algerian terrorists. While the original article on CNN (linked here, in the unlikely event that it returns) gives no indication as to the identity of the responsible parties, the GIA is the most likely suspect.
All of this information begs the question: what's in it for al Qaeda, and what does this mean for the overall campaign against Islamist terrorism? al Qaeda's in tough shape overall. For all of their supposed successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in spite of a report from the New York Times (the most objective, honest, and authoritative information source on terrorism available) that the Iraqi insurgency is financially self-sustaining, al Qaeda is in tough shape. They no longer have freedom of movement or communication; the assets of the central organization have been frozen, confiscated, or compromised; and their upper-eschelon leaders keep getting captured (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Farraj al-Libbi, Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, Abu Nasir al-Qahtani) or killed (Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basayev, Omar al-Farouq). Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, while still on the run, have no freedom of movement. These are just a few examples.
For those of you who don't know, al Qaeda operates as a loose affiliation of like-minded international Islamist terrorist groups. Instead of operating as a highly centralized organization, al Qaeda maintains a decentralized leadership and logistical footprint; as a result, capturing one leader or eliminating one cell won't have a critical impact on the organization as a whole. Coalition forces have eliminated and paralyzed numerous cells and captured or killed numerous individuals. In short, al Qaeda is in trouble, and when a loosely affiliated group of terrorist cells and regionally-based militant organizations hits trouble, the natural recourse is to bring new groups into the fold.
Essentially, there are two possibilities. Either al Qaeda is gaining strength, and they're looking to pass that strength on to the little guys by offering the core group's assistance to regional militant groups like Gemaa Islamiyah and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat; or, more likely, al Qaeda is hemorrhaging membership and resources, and they're doing whatever they can to hold out longer than the forces of Western Civilization.
The more likely case is the latter, but prudent strategic planning requires fighting as if it's the former. The important take-away is that we must continue to do what I've encouraged you readers to do for a long time now: be aware.
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