30 July 2008

Jihadi Observations

How is it Wednesday already? Well, at least oil prices continue to drop. Here's hoping that the bubble's finally burst.

First thing's first: politics. Not so much a post about politics, but a decision on policy. I've decided that I'm going to leave political issues (read: election coverage) to one day per week, probably Thursdays. That allows me to collect a few links as I run across them, while focusing the rest of the week on security analysis or random nonsense, the true lifeblood of TSTF. So, for those of you long-timers who remember the old, old, old days of me posting about politics all the time, look forward to Thursdays. If you don't like me posting about politics, that's going to be the day to skip... I think. Anyway, on with the show.

One thing that I really want to let you all know about is a great project that's going on over at YouTube, that's being led by the Queen of Jordan, Queen Rania. She's running a project to break down people's stereotypes about the Arab world. There's a BBC article here, and you can check out her YouTube channel here. It's very much worth your time to watch a couple of the videos. This is one of the good things that the Internet can be used for.

A couple of topics today: counterinsurgent strategy, and Hezbollah. The AFP reports that American troops in Iraq are employing some French strategies from the Algerian War. It's worth noting that the French lost that war, but the elements of the French strategy that the Americans are using appear to be promising. Meanwhile, the Rand Corporation has proposed an alternate strategy against al Qaeda(AFP, BBC) that focuses on intelligence and policing, vice force. I've been concerned for a long time with the misperception of Islamist terrorism as a criminal issue. Take this segment from the BBC article:

"Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors and our analysis suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism," said Seth Jones, political scientist and lead author of the study.

"The United States has the necessary instruments to defeat al-Qaeda, it just needs to shift its strategy."

The researchers at Rand, which is funded by the US government, studied 648 militant groups which existed between 1968 and 2006 and, based on their findings, the report concluded that only 7% were defeated militarily.

Political settlements helped neutralise 43% groups and an effective use of police and intelligence information helped to disrupt, capture or kill 40% of leaders of such groups, the study says.

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of terrorism, terrorists, and their motivation. Some terrorists may be similar in many ways to criminals; for example, Hezbollah is involved in criminal fundraising activities in the United States, the Taliban exploits illegal opium, and al Qaeda is known to engage in numerous criminal endeavours. However, these groups don't see themselves as criminals; they're not the mob. They see themselves as holy soldiers. You can't stifle a presumptive holy warrior by treating his actions like criminal acts.

The other error that studies like this inevitably make is that the researchers invariably study groups like the Provisional IRA, ETA, and the Baader-Meinhof Group. I've written on this before, although I don't seem to have ever posted that particular article here at the blog. At any rate, I remember a podcast from 2007 in which Louise Richardson of Harvard's Radcliff Institute made illegitimate comparisons of al Qaeda and the IRA, based on her experiences as a young woman growing up in Ulster. (Listen) Although the IRA has worked with various Islamist groups, to include Colonel Qaddhafi and Hezbollah, there are profound differences in both modus operandi and philosophy. This continued attempt by so-called academics to paint Islamist terrorist groups in the same canvass as more moderate terrorist groups, and to suggest law enforcement strategies as the way ahead, is profoundly ignorant. How this isn't obvious from the failed counter-terrorism/policing policies of the Clinton administration is beyond me. Law enforcement is obviously an element of the strategy, and relates to the criminal fundraising efforts of these groups; but because these groups organize and behave so closely to military units, that has to be the predominate system of countering the problem.

Speaking of opium, a columnist for FSM puts in article form a suggestion that I've been making for years: subvert al Qaeda/Taliban funding by using the Afghan opium trade for pharmaceuticals. It's worth the read, and makes the same points that I've been making for years, literally, for years.

And speaking of Hezbollah, I've seen a couple of articles lately that relate to Hezbollah and are worth reading. The first, and most recent, is about how car bombs changed the world, and how Lebanon was the laboratory in which they were perfected during the 1980's. The second makes some fascinating points that suggest that Hezbollah may be fighting itself to extinction. I'm planning on writing an article in the next week or two about the recent Israeli/Hezbollah prisoner swap, and this article brings up some points that haven't been considered with all of the hand-wringing and criticism of the Israeli government. Both articles are worth the read.

Finally, although I'm relatively happy in my current position and plan to stay here for a while, this phase of my life is designed around nomadism. Thus, I'm always interested in articles about whatever the next job will be. Today, I stumbled across a really fascinating one: what to focus on when your interviewer asks, "Why should I hire you?" If I run into that during my next job interview, I have some idea of what I'd say. So, that's your question of the day: if you were asked that question by an interviewer, how would you answer?

Try to keep it under light speed, folks. Check back soon, because there's always more to come.

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