Duck Hunt Goes Global
Author's Note: The title of this post comes from two sources. The first, and likely most familiar to blog denizens, is the 1980's Duck Hunt game for the Nintendo Entertainment System. The second, and more pertinent, is the nick name "Duck Hunter", a colloquial term describing soldiers in the U.S. Army who hold an occupational specialty in the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) community. Ballistic missile defense is essentially ADA on a global level.
The mid-twentieth century saw an arms race on an unprecedented scale between the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact. Beyond the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, a crucial element often overlooked by historians (though rarely by strategists) in the Cold War arms race was the development of delivery systems for the world's deadliest weapons: ballistic missiles.
The concept behind ballistic missiles is simple: long-range missiles are launched into space, and guided reentry vehicles carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons slip back into the earth's atmosphere and target a site of strategic interest. At the height of the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations remained poised and ready to launch land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads at one another. Developments in ballistic missile technology led not only to developments in propulsion, guidance systems, satellite navigation, submarines, and space exploitation, but also in theoretical methods of defense against the missiles themselves.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Warsaw Pact, and the resulting decline in international stability, the United States initiated a renewed drive to research and implement a ballistic missile defense system. Initial setbacks eventually led to succcessful tests of both shore- and sea-based systems. These systems have since been integrated, with radar and interceptor missile systems in Alaska and California. As the U.S. Government prepares to expand the system, international debate has increased regarding the repercussions of implementing such a system.
In addition to the domestic sites, there are two major sites of implementation planned. The first site, so to speak, is Japan, which can be divided in twain: the Sea of Japan, and Japan proper.
The United States Navy is employing the Standard Missile family; the SM2 (Navy Fact File, Global Security) is already being employed, while the SM3 is being developed specifically for the BMD mission. These and other munitions are being married to the Navy's AEGIS command and control system. Several ships have already been outfitted with the program-specific equipment and deployed to the Sea of Japan. Although the system is still under development, American personnel are prepared to attempt an intercept should North Korea attempt to launch an offensive strike.
Meanwhile, on the Japanese islands, Japanese and American military forces are deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 system. Following North Korea's 2006 missile tests, Japanese and American officials announced the planned deployment of the PAC-3 system. The initial deployment of the Patriot system was nearing completion as of October, and in November plans were made to accelerate the implementation of the full system. One element of this acceleration was the March deployment of the PAC-3 system around Tokyo (AP, BBC), a full year ahead of schedule.
Another possible venue for a ballistic missile defense system is South Korea. However, South Korea is well within the range of even North Korea's lowest-range Hwasong 5 SCUD variants. As such, in the unlikely event that North Korea actually targeted South Korea in the first place, they would have no need to use their long-range Taepodong series missiles, which would overshoot South Korea entirely. Thus, a conventional missile defense system for South Korea would be more feasible and cost effective. Reports indicate that South Korea is seeking an independent missile defense system that would fit their unique needs.
The second and more controversial site for the overall program is in Central Europe. The plan for this system calls for a powerful new early warning radar system in the Czech Republic and a battery of interceptor missiles in Poland. There has also been discussion of basing part of the system in the United Kingdom (BBC, Financial Times), which is the site of the newly upgraded early-warning radar facility at Fylingdales in Yorkshire.
The BBC, to its credit, has a simple but informative animated presentation on how the system will work; for the more dedicated researcher, I'd recommend Global Security's extensive section on the actual hardware of the system.
With the nuclear detente following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, some question where the potential threat of ballistic missile attack comes from. Some of you will have read one of my features from January, Fast Times in the DPRK, in which I noted the long history of illicit ballistic missile development by North Korea, and the related connections to nations like Pakistan and Iran.
One threat that's been considered is that of Russia. I don't put a whole lot of stock in the prospect of old Soviet missile silos being overrun and employed by rogue or terrorist elements. Even if the silos were overrun, Russian strategic doctrine places all power in the hands of the highest ranking leadership. I'm not an expert in Russian nuclear launch protocols, but my educated guess is that we have minimal cause for worry about Russian missiles heading our way.
While Pakistan is currently a close ally, the Musharraf government is under constant threat from both terrorists and rival political groups. Pakistani islamist terrorists gaining control of Pakistani missiles and nuclear weapons is unlikely, but not out of the realm of possibility. One need only look back as far as 1979, when Western intelligence assets failed to predict the ouster of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran, which quickly lead to Ayatollah Khomeini's government inheriting sophisticated military equipment that the West sold to the Shah's military. I don't believe that Pervez Musharraf is on the verge of being ousted, but strategic defense requires planning for every contingency.
That having been said, the real threats posed to the West and our allies by ballistic missiles come from North Korea and Iran. I won't repeat myself; read Fast Times in the DPRK for more information. The important take-away is that with a fully operational and guided Taepodong 2/Shahab 6, North Korea could launch an attack on the United States or Iran could launch an attack anywhere in the Middle East, South Asia, or Europe. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Iran and North Korea are negotiating the Iranian purchase of Taepodong 2 missiles. Also, North Korea recently tested two short range missiles (AP, BBC), which only underscores their questionable motives and judgment.
As mentioned previously, the European elements of the missile shield program (a radar station in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland) have provoked several major controversies, both inside and out of the proposed base countries.
There is some public opposition to the interceptor missiles in Poland. Opposition in the Czech Republic has been more labored, with protests taking place in Prague and a village near the proposed site going as far as to veto the plan in a non-binding local poll.
Far greater opposition to the proposed missile shield has come from Russia. Everyone from Russian generals, to the Russian defense minister, to President Vladmir Putin himself have claimed that the missile shield would tip the balance of power in Europe, or become a destabilizing factor. They've claimed that basing the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic would turn those nations into targets, threatened to stop observing treaties, and gone so far as to threaten to aim Russian missiles at Europe as part of "retaliatory measures" (AP, BBC) if the planned system is implemented.
NATO has dismissed Russia's rhetoric, and even gone as far as condemning the threat to target Europe. Germany in particular has also expressed concerns, urging that the system be developed within the framework of NATO; other European nations remain conflicted about the plan. Meanwhile, the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic remain committed to deploying the system.
Several very interesting things have happened lately in relation to the missile shield plan.
There are two primary reasons why I don't see Russia as a threat; ironically, these two reasons probably contribute to Russia's tendency toward saber rattling. At the end of May, Russia unveiled two new systems: the new RS-24 ICBM (AP, BBC), which it claims will be able to defeat any missile defense system; and the S400 missile defense system, which will be deployed around Moscow in the near future.
Russia is eager to regain its place as a military and economic superpower after the fall of the Soviet Empire resulted in an almost immediate collapse of Russia's superpower status. Russia's military is falling apart at the seams; Cold War successes are now overshadowed by the sinking of the Kursk in 2000, or the abysmal and humiliating failure of a major Russian SLBM test (1, 2) in February of 2004. This crisis represents more than a mere loss of prestige for Russia; it represents a loss of credibility. Part of Russia's attempt to reemerge as a world power requires a corresponding reemergence of credible military capability; the feasibility of this plan has yet to be observed.
Russia's other goal is reasserting itself as an economic superpower. The Russian government has made an overwhelming effort to reestablish a government monopoly on natural gas and petroleum resources through the Russian energy corporation known as Gazprom. This included a dispute with Belarus earlier this year, and the Russian government is in the process of ousting BP and other companies from Siberian oil fields. Russia has even gone so far as to seize private companies and incorporate them into Gazprom. However, the Russian government is seeing opposition to this plan from former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, both of which are working to build pipelines in order to gain independence from Russia's current oil and gas transportation monopoly.
Other Russian efforts to boost its economic and political standing include questionable arms sales (1, 2, 3) and supplying both political and technical assistance to Iran on its nuclear program.
The bottom line? Russia needs to engage in military upgrades and saber rattling in an attempt to regain its status as a world military power; however, given that Europe is a major customer for Russian oil and natural gas, Russia is not in a position to serve as a real threat against Europe. At the same time, Vladimir Putin stands to lose more credibility if he allows the United States to build a ballistic missile shield in former Communist Bloc nations without putting up a fight.
Russia made an unexpected move last week when President Putin offered a Soviet-era radar site in Azerbaijan (AP, BBC), as well as other alternatives, and suggested that the United States and Russia might develop the system as a joint venture. NATO representatives have reacted with skepticism to the proposal. Whether or not the Russian proposal will be explored or incorporated has yet to be seen; however, indications remain that any changes will be in addition to, not instead of, the current plan.
Although there is not a clear and present danger from ballistic missiles, that danger from rogue states is nearer than the horizon; it will be upon us in less time than it would take to start developing such a system now. Given that tangible enforcement of international law is less and less likely with each passing year, the reasonable reaction from the United States is the continued development of defensive systems to protect Americans and our allies from such attacks. We are fortunate to have close allies like Poland, the Czech Republic, Japan, and the United Kingdom in such endeavours.
The mid-twentieth century saw an arms race on an unprecedented scale between the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact. Beyond the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, a crucial element often overlooked by historians (though rarely by strategists) in the Cold War arms race was the development of delivery systems for the world's deadliest weapons: ballistic missiles.
The concept behind ballistic missiles is simple: long-range missiles are launched into space, and guided reentry vehicles carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons slip back into the earth's atmosphere and target a site of strategic interest. At the height of the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations remained poised and ready to launch land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads at one another. Developments in ballistic missile technology led not only to developments in propulsion, guidance systems, satellite navigation, submarines, and space exploitation, but also in theoretical methods of defense against the missiles themselves.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Warsaw Pact, and the resulting decline in international stability, the United States initiated a renewed drive to research and implement a ballistic missile defense system. Initial setbacks eventually led to succcessful tests of both shore- and sea-based systems. These systems have since been integrated, with radar and interceptor missile systems in Alaska and California. As the U.S. Government prepares to expand the system, international debate has increased regarding the repercussions of implementing such a system.
In addition to the domestic sites, there are two major sites of implementation planned. The first site, so to speak, is Japan, which can be divided in twain: the Sea of Japan, and Japan proper.
The United States Navy is employing the Standard Missile family; the SM2 (Navy Fact File, Global Security) is already being employed, while the SM3 is being developed specifically for the BMD mission. These and other munitions are being married to the Navy's AEGIS command and control system. Several ships have already been outfitted with the program-specific equipment and deployed to the Sea of Japan. Although the system is still under development, American personnel are prepared to attempt an intercept should North Korea attempt to launch an offensive strike.
Meanwhile, on the Japanese islands, Japanese and American military forces are deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 system. Following North Korea's 2006 missile tests, Japanese and American officials announced the planned deployment of the PAC-3 system. The initial deployment of the Patriot system was nearing completion as of October, and in November plans were made to accelerate the implementation of the full system. One element of this acceleration was the March deployment of the PAC-3 system around Tokyo (AP, BBC), a full year ahead of schedule.
Another possible venue for a ballistic missile defense system is South Korea. However, South Korea is well within the range of even North Korea's lowest-range Hwasong 5 SCUD variants. As such, in the unlikely event that North Korea actually targeted South Korea in the first place, they would have no need to use their long-range Taepodong series missiles, which would overshoot South Korea entirely. Thus, a conventional missile defense system for South Korea would be more feasible and cost effective. Reports indicate that South Korea is seeking an independent missile defense system that would fit their unique needs.
The second and more controversial site for the overall program is in Central Europe. The plan for this system calls for a powerful new early warning radar system in the Czech Republic and a battery of interceptor missiles in Poland. There has also been discussion of basing part of the system in the United Kingdom (BBC, Financial Times), which is the site of the newly upgraded early-warning radar facility at Fylingdales in Yorkshire.
The BBC, to its credit, has a simple but informative animated presentation on how the system will work; for the more dedicated researcher, I'd recommend Global Security's extensive section on the actual hardware of the system.
With the nuclear detente following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, some question where the potential threat of ballistic missile attack comes from. Some of you will have read one of my features from January, Fast Times in the DPRK, in which I noted the long history of illicit ballistic missile development by North Korea, and the related connections to nations like Pakistan and Iran.
One threat that's been considered is that of Russia. I don't put a whole lot of stock in the prospect of old Soviet missile silos being overrun and employed by rogue or terrorist elements. Even if the silos were overrun, Russian strategic doctrine places all power in the hands of the highest ranking leadership. I'm not an expert in Russian nuclear launch protocols, but my educated guess is that we have minimal cause for worry about Russian missiles heading our way.
While Pakistan is currently a close ally, the Musharraf government is under constant threat from both terrorists and rival political groups. Pakistani islamist terrorists gaining control of Pakistani missiles and nuclear weapons is unlikely, but not out of the realm of possibility. One need only look back as far as 1979, when Western intelligence assets failed to predict the ouster of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran, which quickly lead to Ayatollah Khomeini's government inheriting sophisticated military equipment that the West sold to the Shah's military. I don't believe that Pervez Musharraf is on the verge of being ousted, but strategic defense requires planning for every contingency.
That having been said, the real threats posed to the West and our allies by ballistic missiles come from North Korea and Iran. I won't repeat myself; read Fast Times in the DPRK for more information. The important take-away is that with a fully operational and guided Taepodong 2/Shahab 6, North Korea could launch an attack on the United States or Iran could launch an attack anywhere in the Middle East, South Asia, or Europe. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Iran and North Korea are negotiating the Iranian purchase of Taepodong 2 missiles. Also, North Korea recently tested two short range missiles (AP, BBC), which only underscores their questionable motives and judgment.
As mentioned previously, the European elements of the missile shield program (a radar station in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland) have provoked several major controversies, both inside and out of the proposed base countries.
There is some public opposition to the interceptor missiles in Poland. Opposition in the Czech Republic has been more labored, with protests taking place in Prague and a village near the proposed site going as far as to veto the plan in a non-binding local poll.
Far greater opposition to the proposed missile shield has come from Russia. Everyone from Russian generals, to the Russian defense minister, to President Vladmir Putin himself have claimed that the missile shield would tip the balance of power in Europe, or become a destabilizing factor. They've claimed that basing the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic would turn those nations into targets, threatened to stop observing treaties, and gone so far as to threaten to aim Russian missiles at Europe as part of "retaliatory measures" (AP, BBC) if the planned system is implemented.
NATO has dismissed Russia's rhetoric, and even gone as far as condemning the threat to target Europe. Germany in particular has also expressed concerns, urging that the system be developed within the framework of NATO; other European nations remain conflicted about the plan. Meanwhile, the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic remain committed to deploying the system.
Several very interesting things have happened lately in relation to the missile shield plan.
There are two primary reasons why I don't see Russia as a threat; ironically, these two reasons probably contribute to Russia's tendency toward saber rattling. At the end of May, Russia unveiled two new systems: the new RS-24 ICBM (AP, BBC), which it claims will be able to defeat any missile defense system; and the S400 missile defense system, which will be deployed around Moscow in the near future.
Russia is eager to regain its place as a military and economic superpower after the fall of the Soviet Empire resulted in an almost immediate collapse of Russia's superpower status. Russia's military is falling apart at the seams; Cold War successes are now overshadowed by the sinking of the Kursk in 2000, or the abysmal and humiliating failure of a major Russian SLBM test (1, 2) in February of 2004. This crisis represents more than a mere loss of prestige for Russia; it represents a loss of credibility. Part of Russia's attempt to reemerge as a world power requires a corresponding reemergence of credible military capability; the feasibility of this plan has yet to be observed.
Russia's other goal is reasserting itself as an economic superpower. The Russian government has made an overwhelming effort to reestablish a government monopoly on natural gas and petroleum resources through the Russian energy corporation known as Gazprom. This included a dispute with Belarus earlier this year, and the Russian government is in the process of ousting BP and other companies from Siberian oil fields. Russia has even gone so far as to seize private companies and incorporate them into Gazprom. However, the Russian government is seeing opposition to this plan from former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, both of which are working to build pipelines in order to gain independence from Russia's current oil and gas transportation monopoly.
Other Russian efforts to boost its economic and political standing include questionable arms sales (1, 2, 3) and supplying both political and technical assistance to Iran on its nuclear program.
The bottom line? Russia needs to engage in military upgrades and saber rattling in an attempt to regain its status as a world military power; however, given that Europe is a major customer for Russian oil and natural gas, Russia is not in a position to serve as a real threat against Europe. At the same time, Vladimir Putin stands to lose more credibility if he allows the United States to build a ballistic missile shield in former Communist Bloc nations without putting up a fight.
Russia made an unexpected move last week when President Putin offered a Soviet-era radar site in Azerbaijan (AP, BBC), as well as other alternatives, and suggested that the United States and Russia might develop the system as a joint venture. NATO representatives have reacted with skepticism to the proposal. Whether or not the Russian proposal will be explored or incorporated has yet to be seen; however, indications remain that any changes will be in addition to, not instead of, the current plan.
Although there is not a clear and present danger from ballistic missiles, that danger from rogue states is nearer than the horizon; it will be upon us in less time than it would take to start developing such a system now. Given that tangible enforcement of international law is less and less likely with each passing year, the reasonable reaction from the United States is the continued development of defensive systems to protect Americans and our allies from such attacks. We are fortunate to have close allies like Poland, the Czech Republic, Japan, and the United Kingdom in such endeavours.
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