The Declining Pacifism of Germany and Japan
Note: I originally submitted this elsewhere, and I'm finally getting around to including the appropriate links and posting it here. If there seem to be a couple of disconnects here or there, the reason is that the piece was originally written and published in two parts. I've been bragging this one up for quite a while, so I hope you folks enjoy it.
In many ways, the international war on terror has been a continuing exercise in mitigating the law of unintended consequences. For many, these unintended consequences take the form of a resurgent Taliban movement, or political turmoil in Baghdad. However, one unintended consequence of the shift in world politics since 2001 may be the reemergence of two of America's close allies as important world military powers.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan and Germany increased their military infrastructure while expanding their political dominance in their respective spheres of influence; in the case of Germany, this process happened twice, and despite of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Allied during World War II, their respective defeats led to imposed restructuring of their governments. Many of these constraints still exist.
The end of World War II saw the fallen fascist state divided in twain: half occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France; and the other half occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union. When the occupation period concluded, two nations remained: the democratic Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Germany), and the communist Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany). The dividing line between the two nations would join Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Central America, and other regions as intelligence and military campaign hot spots in the conflict between NATO and their allies, and the communist Warsaw Pact. These proxy conflicts would eventually come to be known as the Cold War. Although the constitution of the BRD limited the new Bundeswehr to defensive operations within the borders of West Germany, the shared border with the communist GDR and Czechoslovakia necessitated a heightened security posture and close cooperation with its NATO allies.
Japan's postwar development was diametrically different than that of her former ally. Japan was directed to adopt a pacifist constitution in 1947, fundamentally limiting the mandate of the Japanese military to self-defense under the direct supervision of the prime minister, with oversight by the parliament. Although Japan sports an army, a navy, and an air force, they are widely recognized as insufficient to defend Japan from a concerted attack. Japan and the United States share overall responsibility for the defense of Japanese territory through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed in 1960. The close economic and political relationship between the two nations has resulted in a strong, shared defense posture.
The allied war against international terrorism has changed international relations throughout the world. Much has been made of the opposition of such nations as France and Russia to the Iraq War. Indeed, Germany under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also opposed the Iraq War. However, the end of the Cold War, and several subsequent developments, are leading to a dramatic restructuring of numerous European armies, including the Bundeswehr. These developments have also led the Japanese government to take preliminary measures directed at expanding Japan's ability to influence important world events through the deployment of the Japanese Defense Forces.
The German Bundeswehr, originally encompassing the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, was designed to operate exclusively within the borders of Germany in the event of a communist invasion. Reunification and the fall of the Soviet bloc resulted in a new challenge, and the force has seen changes in recent years, ranging from a drawdown of forces and liquidation of surplus equipment to deployments abroad.
The deployment of German troops outside German borders began in the early 1990s, when German troops participated in United Nations peacekeeping missions to Somalia (1992) and the former Yugoslavia (1993). This led to a constitutional debate, which was eventually settled by Federal Constitutional Court in 1994. The court's decision in favor of out-of-area deployments in support of wider German security concerns and peacekeeping led to subsequent deployments in such nations as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In the last few months, the Bundeswehr has committed a sizable contingent to the UNIFIL II mission to Lebanon, and German troops are involved in training Iraqi security forces in locations outside Iraq.
Several obstacles stand in the way of Germany's expanded military role in international operations. As previously mentioned, the German constitution is pacifist leaning. In October of 2006, the German government reviewed national security doctrine and concluded that German troops could take on greater responsibilities. Another obstacle comes in the form of Germany's policy of conscription, an institution that often limits the deployment of troops due to political constraints. The German government began moving toward the abolition of conscription under Schröder, and this transition continues under Chancellor Angela Merkel. The goal is to field a completely professional force by the end of the decade. This would allow for a reduction of roughly one billion euros per year in personnel-related expenditures, allowing the Bundeswehr to channel those funds into desperately needed equipment acquisitions and modernization programs.
Although the Bundeswehr has participated in operations outside Germany, these have also resulted in controversy. The German UNIFIL II contribution boasts no ground troops, as the German government is nervous about the unlikely prospect of a military confrontation with Israeli troops. Also, Germany's contingent in Afghanistan is confined to reconstruction and support operations in non-combat zones, drawing criticism from the handful of NATO allies actually committed to combat roles. In addition, the expanded German deployments are confined to UN-mandated missions within the framework of NATO and other European military alliances; while understandable, these caveats further limit Germany's ability to support independent operations.
Additional articles on the subject can be found here and here
In spite of these setbacks and limitations, Germany's expanded involvement in military operations worldwide provide valuable assets to the mission of providing safety and stability in the world's hot spots.
The last several years have seen great changes in the military outlook of Japan, with the Japanese government making a concerted effort to take on a larger international role. This has ranged from increased deployments of the Japanese Self Defense Forces, to legislative proceedings directed at reducing the constraints on the mandate of the military.
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi passed legislation in early December of 2003 allowing Japan's first combat deployment since World War II, sending six hundred non-combat troops to the southern Iraqi city of Samawa. A controversial move on the part of the Koizumi government, Japan's Iraq primary deployment lasted from January of 2004 until spring of 2006. Under the protection of British and Australian troops, and operating from a Dutch base, Japanese troops provided infrastructure reconstruction and medical services to the Iraqi people. Although the primary deployment has concluded, Japanese forces still assist in Kuwait-based logistical operations.
Japan has also been heavily involved in American efforts to establish a ballistic missile defense program. Separated from North Korea by only a few hundred miles, North Korea's ballistic missile program has served as a constant source of anxiety for the Japanese people. The resolve of the Japanese government has been constant with respect to the installation of a joint missile shield program, and American PAC-3 missiles are in the process of being deployed in Japan.
Currently, Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan "renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Deployments to Iraq, a 2004 deployment to Indonesia to assist with tsunami relief efforts, and the aforementioned ballistic missile defense participation all represent an escalation of Japan's use of the Self Defense Forces as a growing tool of foreign policy.
Because of the constitutional constraints on such a policy, the government of Junichiro Koizumi, and his successor Shinzo Abe, have initiated and continued efforts at amending the Japanese constitution. In April and May, the Japanese parliament passed legislation setting a framework for a referendum on the issue. The referendum is likely to be successful. In addition, the defense organization was elevated from an agency to the level of a full government ministry in January of this year, and Japan signed a security pact with Australia in March.
Another manifestation of this shift in Japan's political culture is Japan's continuing effort to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; only the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia currently hold this status, as has been the case since the establishment of the United Nations after World War II. Japanese leaders hope that playing a more active role in the international community, including military operations, will elevate its Security Council agenda.
The path to a stronger military presence in the world at large is not an easy one for Japan. The aforementioned deployment to Iraq was highly controversial, due in large part to its apparent circumvention of the Japanese constitution. Japan has also experienced continued political fallout from World War II in the last several years, tied primarily to visits by Japanese prime ministers to war shrines. These visits sparked a diplomatic conflict between Japan and China in 2005.
There are both benefits and drawbacks to the limited remilitarization of Japan and Germany. As previously mentioned, both nations continue to carry political baggage resulting from their role in World War II, which results in limitations in their expanded mandate. In addition, neither are large nations on the scale of Russia, China, or the United States; the result of this is that, while their elevated role will provide political and logistical support, neither nation is likely to field an extensive occupation force. As the last six years have demonstrated, the occupations the international community is likely to be engaged in during the coming years require more than air power - they require ground forces in a consistent volume.
Political constraints are also an issue in both nations. Even though the Japanese government supported and assisted with the Iraq War, public approval was in no way widespread. Meanwhile, the German government has allowed the Bundeswehr to operate only in safe, secure areas of Afghanistan. The political culture of both nations is likely to preclude their troops from engaging in a heavy combat role in future operations. The alteration of Japan's constitution, and the end of German conscription, could afford both the JSDF and the Bundeswehr greater flexibility, but they will likely continue to operate under tight constraints.
These things having been said, any additional support America finds from allied nations is welcome and necessary. With many nations down-sizing their forces in spite of the continued threat of international terrorism, any political, logistical, or combat support these allies are willing to offer should be encouraged and accommodated to the best of America's ability.
Further, the fact that the two nations that were once America's most dangerous enemies are now two valued allies should bring a glimmer of hope to those worried about strategic setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Japan and Germany can take their place as respected and valued world leaders, there is no reason to believe that Iraq and Afghanistan will be incapable of doing the same.
In many ways, the international war on terror has been a continuing exercise in mitigating the law of unintended consequences. For many, these unintended consequences take the form of a resurgent Taliban movement, or political turmoil in Baghdad. However, one unintended consequence of the shift in world politics since 2001 may be the reemergence of two of America's close allies as important world military powers.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan and Germany increased their military infrastructure while expanding their political dominance in their respective spheres of influence; in the case of Germany, this process happened twice, and despite of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Allied during World War II, their respective defeats led to imposed restructuring of their governments. Many of these constraints still exist.
The end of World War II saw the fallen fascist state divided in twain: half occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France; and the other half occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union. When the occupation period concluded, two nations remained: the democratic Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Germany), and the communist Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany). The dividing line between the two nations would join Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Central America, and other regions as intelligence and military campaign hot spots in the conflict between NATO and their allies, and the communist Warsaw Pact. These proxy conflicts would eventually come to be known as the Cold War. Although the constitution of the BRD limited the new Bundeswehr to defensive operations within the borders of West Germany, the shared border with the communist GDR and Czechoslovakia necessitated a heightened security posture and close cooperation with its NATO allies.
Japan's postwar development was diametrically different than that of her former ally. Japan was directed to adopt a pacifist constitution in 1947, fundamentally limiting the mandate of the Japanese military to self-defense under the direct supervision of the prime minister, with oversight by the parliament. Although Japan sports an army, a navy, and an air force, they are widely recognized as insufficient to defend Japan from a concerted attack. Japan and the United States share overall responsibility for the defense of Japanese territory through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed in 1960. The close economic and political relationship between the two nations has resulted in a strong, shared defense posture.
The allied war against international terrorism has changed international relations throughout the world. Much has been made of the opposition of such nations as France and Russia to the Iraq War. Indeed, Germany under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also opposed the Iraq War. However, the end of the Cold War, and several subsequent developments, are leading to a dramatic restructuring of numerous European armies, including the Bundeswehr. These developments have also led the Japanese government to take preliminary measures directed at expanding Japan's ability to influence important world events through the deployment of the Japanese Defense Forces.
The German Bundeswehr, originally encompassing the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, was designed to operate exclusively within the borders of Germany in the event of a communist invasion. Reunification and the fall of the Soviet bloc resulted in a new challenge, and the force has seen changes in recent years, ranging from a drawdown of forces and liquidation of surplus equipment to deployments abroad.
The deployment of German troops outside German borders began in the early 1990s, when German troops participated in United Nations peacekeeping missions to Somalia (1992) and the former Yugoslavia (1993). This led to a constitutional debate, which was eventually settled by Federal Constitutional Court in 1994. The court's decision in favor of out-of-area deployments in support of wider German security concerns and peacekeeping led to subsequent deployments in such nations as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In the last few months, the Bundeswehr has committed a sizable contingent to the UNIFIL II mission to Lebanon, and German troops are involved in training Iraqi security forces in locations outside Iraq.
Several obstacles stand in the way of Germany's expanded military role in international operations. As previously mentioned, the German constitution is pacifist leaning. In October of 2006, the German government reviewed national security doctrine and concluded that German troops could take on greater responsibilities. Another obstacle comes in the form of Germany's policy of conscription, an institution that often limits the deployment of troops due to political constraints. The German government began moving toward the abolition of conscription under Schröder, and this transition continues under Chancellor Angela Merkel. The goal is to field a completely professional force by the end of the decade. This would allow for a reduction of roughly one billion euros per year in personnel-related expenditures, allowing the Bundeswehr to channel those funds into desperately needed equipment acquisitions and modernization programs.
Although the Bundeswehr has participated in operations outside Germany, these have also resulted in controversy. The German UNIFIL II contribution boasts no ground troops, as the German government is nervous about the unlikely prospect of a military confrontation with Israeli troops. Also, Germany's contingent in Afghanistan is confined to reconstruction and support operations in non-combat zones, drawing criticism from the handful of NATO allies actually committed to combat roles. In addition, the expanded German deployments are confined to UN-mandated missions within the framework of NATO and other European military alliances; while understandable, these caveats further limit Germany's ability to support independent operations.
Additional articles on the subject can be found here and here
In spite of these setbacks and limitations, Germany's expanded involvement in military operations worldwide provide valuable assets to the mission of providing safety and stability in the world's hot spots.
The last several years have seen great changes in the military outlook of Japan, with the Japanese government making a concerted effort to take on a larger international role. This has ranged from increased deployments of the Japanese Self Defense Forces, to legislative proceedings directed at reducing the constraints on the mandate of the military.
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi passed legislation in early December of 2003 allowing Japan's first combat deployment since World War II, sending six hundred non-combat troops to the southern Iraqi city of Samawa. A controversial move on the part of the Koizumi government, Japan's Iraq primary deployment lasted from January of 2004 until spring of 2006. Under the protection of British and Australian troops, and operating from a Dutch base, Japanese troops provided infrastructure reconstruction and medical services to the Iraqi people. Although the primary deployment has concluded, Japanese forces still assist in Kuwait-based logistical operations.
Japan has also been heavily involved in American efforts to establish a ballistic missile defense program. Separated from North Korea by only a few hundred miles, North Korea's ballistic missile program has served as a constant source of anxiety for the Japanese people. The resolve of the Japanese government has been constant with respect to the installation of a joint missile shield program, and American PAC-3 missiles are in the process of being deployed in Japan.
Currently, Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan "renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Deployments to Iraq, a 2004 deployment to Indonesia to assist with tsunami relief efforts, and the aforementioned ballistic missile defense participation all represent an escalation of Japan's use of the Self Defense Forces as a growing tool of foreign policy.
Because of the constitutional constraints on such a policy, the government of Junichiro Koizumi, and his successor Shinzo Abe, have initiated and continued efforts at amending the Japanese constitution. In April and May, the Japanese parliament passed legislation setting a framework for a referendum on the issue. The referendum is likely to be successful. In addition, the defense organization was elevated from an agency to the level of a full government ministry in January of this year, and Japan signed a security pact with Australia in March.
Another manifestation of this shift in Japan's political culture is Japan's continuing effort to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; only the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia currently hold this status, as has been the case since the establishment of the United Nations after World War II. Japanese leaders hope that playing a more active role in the international community, including military operations, will elevate its Security Council agenda.
The path to a stronger military presence in the world at large is not an easy one for Japan. The aforementioned deployment to Iraq was highly controversial, due in large part to its apparent circumvention of the Japanese constitution. Japan has also experienced continued political fallout from World War II in the last several years, tied primarily to visits by Japanese prime ministers to war shrines. These visits sparked a diplomatic conflict between Japan and China in 2005.
There are both benefits and drawbacks to the limited remilitarization of Japan and Germany. As previously mentioned, both nations continue to carry political baggage resulting from their role in World War II, which results in limitations in their expanded mandate. In addition, neither are large nations on the scale of Russia, China, or the United States; the result of this is that, while their elevated role will provide political and logistical support, neither nation is likely to field an extensive occupation force. As the last six years have demonstrated, the occupations the international community is likely to be engaged in during the coming years require more than air power - they require ground forces in a consistent volume.
Political constraints are also an issue in both nations. Even though the Japanese government supported and assisted with the Iraq War, public approval was in no way widespread. Meanwhile, the German government has allowed the Bundeswehr to operate only in safe, secure areas of Afghanistan. The political culture of both nations is likely to preclude their troops from engaging in a heavy combat role in future operations. The alteration of Japan's constitution, and the end of German conscription, could afford both the JSDF and the Bundeswehr greater flexibility, but they will likely continue to operate under tight constraints.
These things having been said, any additional support America finds from allied nations is welcome and necessary. With many nations down-sizing their forces in spite of the continued threat of international terrorism, any political, logistical, or combat support these allies are willing to offer should be encouraged and accommodated to the best of America's ability.
Further, the fact that the two nations that were once America's most dangerous enemies are now two valued allies should bring a glimmer of hope to those worried about strategic setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Japan and Germany can take their place as respected and valued world leaders, there is no reason to believe that Iraq and Afghanistan will be incapable of doing the same.
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