Understanding Chechnya Part II: The First Chechen War
Note: This is my second in a series of articles for my parallel writing endeavour. A remote and poorly understood component of the Russian Federation, Chechen history is dominated by secessionism and influenced in part by Islamism. In order to understand the global connections of international terrorism, one must understand Chechnya.
In the years directly following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the tiny Russian republic of Chechnya became increasingly independent. Having declared their independence from Russia on several previous occasions, the Chechens prepared Grozny for the coming invasion by Russia in the hopes that they would be able to bleed Russian resolve. Meanwhile, Russia appeared to make exacting preparations for a massive assault; as the waning days of 1994 would show, Russian military leaders made numerous critical errors. The First Chechen War, as it would come to be known, became an object lesson in failed urban warfare doctrines.
The Russian army planned to invade Chechnya using three columns to enter Grozny, the Chechen capital. Russian troops were dispatched to the north, west, and east sides of the city in an attempt to force the Chechen rebels, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, into the mountains south of the city. Instead of planning an escape to the mountains, the Chechens used this opening in the Russian formation to continue importing supplies well after the invasion had begun. Because of both this, and the slow pace of the Russian columns, Chechens united to reinforce Grozny, even after the Russian army finally reached the city.
On paper, Russian threw massive amounts of force into the operation. In reality, most units had only thirty to fifty percent of their proper manpower; in turn, most of these were conscripts with less than one year of military service. They were also unfamiliar with the territory and Grozny itself. Many Chechens, however, were veterans of compulsory Russian military service. They knew Russian military doctrine, they were familiar with Russian equipment, and they knew their own geography well.
Russian forces encountered resistance even before they crossed into Chechnya. In 1992, a Russian military operation had involved ethnic cleansing in Northern Ossetia, the Russian republic West of Chechnya. Whether the Ossetians were asked by Dudayev for assistance or not is unknown, but the Ossetians attacked the western column. The other columns were bogged down by sniper and RPG attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes, rendering them ineffective. The invasion started on 11th December; it was 24th December before Grozny was finally "surrounded"; the southern sector was left open for several more days, allowing Dudayev and his forces to keep bringing in supplies.
Originally expected to take mere days, the invasion had already taken nearly two weeks. The Russians marched on Grozny in the waning hours of 1994, expecting to quickly reach the Chechen presidential palace - the first squad to reach this strategic position was promised the Hero of Russia medal. Instead, the Chechens had blocked off roads, forcing the Russians into specific avenues. With the Russians bottleknecked, the Chechens pinned them down with sniper fire from the surrounding buildings, followed by RPG attacks and ambushes that wreaked havoc on the Russian conscripts. In the narrow streets, the Chechens would attack the front and rear vehicles, confining the remaining vehicles so that they could be picked off one by one.
Even the Russian aerial strategy was flawed. Attack helicopters were employed only during the initial phase of the assault; once Russian troops had reached Grozny, they were supported only by fixed-wing aircraft. Although the Russians destroyed Chechen airports and aircraft, most of these were training aircraft, and this focus had little bearing on the rest of the conflict. The Russian battle plan called for the elite special forces units, or Spetsnaz, to be deployed by helicopter in the mountains surrounding Grozny in order to disrupt Chechen operations there. Instead, most of the Spetsnaz troops surrendered to the Chechens after wandering for days without food or any tangible instructions.
The Chechens emphasized mental toughness, stockpiled ammunition and supplies, and operated in flexible, independent guerrilla units. Chechen forces were not only well-prepared, but mature, well-trained, and motivated by the desire to defend their homeland. The Russians, however, we understaffed, poorly coordinated, and doctrinally deficient - in short, they were completely unprepared for what they were about to encounter. It took until 26th January 1995 for Federal forces to capture the Grozny presidential palace, and urban warfare raged through February. It wasn't until late March that Grozny was actually consolidated, and by then most of the city's residents had fled. Fighting raged in the mountains until 1996, when near-total public opposition to the war led Boris Yeltsin to finally suspend the operation and sign a peace treaty.
In many ways, the siege of Grozny and the ensuing war were inevitable. The Chechens were motivated by a mix of nationalism and religious fervor, and their separatist history compelled them to once again seize the opportunity of a weak and preoccupied Russia to attempt a forced independence. Meanwhile, Moscow was motivated by economic, political, and social motivators to prevent a second secessionist domino effect from beginning. Although the invasion was likely to have been bloody and protracted no matter what, the near-total failure of the Russian military to secure a timely victory was astonishing. Had the Russian military leadership put forth a realistic and cognizant plan, the conflict may not have dragged into a two year boondoggle that ended in a bloody stalemate.
Unfortunately for both the Russians and the Chechens, this bloody stalemate was only temporary. The First Chechen War would only set the stage for subsequent conflicts in the Caucasus.
In the years directly following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the tiny Russian republic of Chechnya became increasingly independent. Having declared their independence from Russia on several previous occasions, the Chechens prepared Grozny for the coming invasion by Russia in the hopes that they would be able to bleed Russian resolve. Meanwhile, Russia appeared to make exacting preparations for a massive assault; as the waning days of 1994 would show, Russian military leaders made numerous critical errors. The First Chechen War, as it would come to be known, became an object lesson in failed urban warfare doctrines.
The Russian army planned to invade Chechnya using three columns to enter Grozny, the Chechen capital. Russian troops were dispatched to the north, west, and east sides of the city in an attempt to force the Chechen rebels, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, into the mountains south of the city. Instead of planning an escape to the mountains, the Chechens used this opening in the Russian formation to continue importing supplies well after the invasion had begun. Because of both this, and the slow pace of the Russian columns, Chechens united to reinforce Grozny, even after the Russian army finally reached the city.
On paper, Russian threw massive amounts of force into the operation. In reality, most units had only thirty to fifty percent of their proper manpower; in turn, most of these were conscripts with less than one year of military service. They were also unfamiliar with the territory and Grozny itself. Many Chechens, however, were veterans of compulsory Russian military service. They knew Russian military doctrine, they were familiar with Russian equipment, and they knew their own geography well.
Russian forces encountered resistance even before they crossed into Chechnya. In 1992, a Russian military operation had involved ethnic cleansing in Northern Ossetia, the Russian republic West of Chechnya. Whether the Ossetians were asked by Dudayev for assistance or not is unknown, but the Ossetians attacked the western column. The other columns were bogged down by sniper and RPG attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes, rendering them ineffective. The invasion started on 11th December; it was 24th December before Grozny was finally "surrounded"; the southern sector was left open for several more days, allowing Dudayev and his forces to keep bringing in supplies.
Originally expected to take mere days, the invasion had already taken nearly two weeks. The Russians marched on Grozny in the waning hours of 1994, expecting to quickly reach the Chechen presidential palace - the first squad to reach this strategic position was promised the Hero of Russia medal. Instead, the Chechens had blocked off roads, forcing the Russians into specific avenues. With the Russians bottleknecked, the Chechens pinned them down with sniper fire from the surrounding buildings, followed by RPG attacks and ambushes that wreaked havoc on the Russian conscripts. In the narrow streets, the Chechens would attack the front and rear vehicles, confining the remaining vehicles so that they could be picked off one by one.
Even the Russian aerial strategy was flawed. Attack helicopters were employed only during the initial phase of the assault; once Russian troops had reached Grozny, they were supported only by fixed-wing aircraft. Although the Russians destroyed Chechen airports and aircraft, most of these were training aircraft, and this focus had little bearing on the rest of the conflict. The Russian battle plan called for the elite special forces units, or Spetsnaz, to be deployed by helicopter in the mountains surrounding Grozny in order to disrupt Chechen operations there. Instead, most of the Spetsnaz troops surrendered to the Chechens after wandering for days without food or any tangible instructions.
The Chechens emphasized mental toughness, stockpiled ammunition and supplies, and operated in flexible, independent guerrilla units. Chechen forces were not only well-prepared, but mature, well-trained, and motivated by the desire to defend their homeland. The Russians, however, we understaffed, poorly coordinated, and doctrinally deficient - in short, they were completely unprepared for what they were about to encounter. It took until 26th January 1995 for Federal forces to capture the Grozny presidential palace, and urban warfare raged through February. It wasn't until late March that Grozny was actually consolidated, and by then most of the city's residents had fled. Fighting raged in the mountains until 1996, when near-total public opposition to the war led Boris Yeltsin to finally suspend the operation and sign a peace treaty.
In many ways, the siege of Grozny and the ensuing war were inevitable. The Chechens were motivated by a mix of nationalism and religious fervor, and their separatist history compelled them to once again seize the opportunity of a weak and preoccupied Russia to attempt a forced independence. Meanwhile, Moscow was motivated by economic, political, and social motivators to prevent a second secessionist domino effect from beginning. Although the invasion was likely to have been bloody and protracted no matter what, the near-total failure of the Russian military to secure a timely victory was astonishing. Had the Russian military leadership put forth a realistic and cognizant plan, the conflict may not have dragged into a two year boondoggle that ended in a bloody stalemate.
Unfortunately for both the Russians and the Chechens, this bloody stalemate was only temporary. The First Chechen War would only set the stage for subsequent conflicts in the Caucasus.
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