19 November 2008

The Strategic Necessity of Mauritania

Note: This is my latest article for my parallel writing endeavour. I'll have a regular post tomorrow morning, and thanks to Desert Rat Tim, it will include some chicanerific stuff. Enjoy, and check back tomorrow.

While a great deal of attention remains focused on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and on a handful of other regional fights, analysts and pundits often ignore the relative calm of a handful of strategic countries around the globe. These nations have an impact on both the physical and economic security of the world, yet few know of their importance - and in some cases, their very existence.

One such nation is Mauritania, an impoverished desert backwater on Africa's northwest coast. Mauritania's population consists of Arabs, as well as several different Berber and West African ethnic groups. With almost no arable land, Mauritania is entirely reliant upon foreign food aid. In the last few years, Mauritania has discovered potential petroleum resources off its coast, but exploitation of these resources has been limited thus far. In addition, Mauritania has recently seen more than its fair share of political turmoil. Mauritania's widespread poverty, combined with the Islamic beliefs of its population, make it a target not only for attacks from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but also for radicalization and recruitment.

As the leading nations of Europe annexed various areas of the world during the 1800s, Mauritania became one of a number of French holdings in North Africa to include Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria. Mauritania gained its independence from France in November of 1960, and what followed was several decades of mismanagement by a series of dictators. The first of these was Moktar Ould Daddah, whose presidency ushered in nearly two decades of iron-fisted rule. His crowning achievement was a temporary and ill-conceived annexation of part of Western Sahara. After three failed years of war against the Polisario Front for control of this territory, Daddah was deposed in a bloodless coup. His successor, Col. Mustafa Ould Mohammed Salek, discontinued the war in Western Sahara and ruled for less than a year before a second coup led to the installation of another member of the junta, Col. Mohammed Mahmoud Ould Ahmed Louly. Like his predecessor, Louly held the presidency for less than a year before the junta replaced him with Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla. Haidalla held the presidency for nearly five years, despite one failed coup attempt in 1981 that was allegedly supported by Morocco, and a later attempt sponsored by Libya. While he was outside the country in late 1984, Haidalla's former prime minister, Mouawiyah Ould Sidi Ahmed al Taya, staged yet another coup.

Taya went on to become Mauritania's longest-serving head of state. Although his rule moved the country from a military dictatorship to a nominally multi-party, democratic system, this was essentially a farce. Taya garnered more than 60% of votes in the 1992 election, and more than 90% in the essentially uncontested election of 1997. In addition to his heavy-handed rule against opposing ethnic groups and Mauritania's Islamists, Taya made several foreign policy decisions that contributed to collapsing sentiment among his subordinates and the Mauritanian populace. After supporting Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War, Taya began to ally himself with the West in the late 1990s. In 1999, Taya made Mauritania the third Arab country to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. Taya survived several actual and alleged coup attempts in the early ‘90s, in addition to yet another irregular election.

In Mauritania, coups and coup attempts tend to occur when heads of state are absent. In 2005, a handful of conspirators waited for just such an opportunity. Then, in the initial hours of August, the opportunity presented itself with the death of King Fahd, the ailing monarch of Saudi Arabia. Taya left the country to pay his respects in Riyadh, and a junta led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohammed Vall seized the moment and terminated his presidency. Whereas previous coups had served as vehicles to bestow power upon a handful of conspirators, Vall's coup announced a plan for real and transparent democratic reforms. The ambitious plan called for a constitutional referendum, parliamentary elections, and a general election within two years. The coup was widely supported within Mauritania, and the announcement was greeted with cheering in the streets of the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott. The international community initially condemned the coup, but this condemnation quickly subsided. The democratic process proceeded with a successful constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections, and was completed with the election of President Sidi Mohammed Ould al Sheikh Abdallahi in March of 2007.

President Abdallahi, a previously disgraced civil servant, took office as Mauritania was poised to suffer uniquely from deteriorating global conditions. A long-term drought in the Sahara not only threatens to engulf Mauritanian homes, but has combined with rising food prices caused by ethanol production to produce severe food shortages. These shortages have been so pronounced that the Mauritanian government moved to ban some fish exports in October - saving food for Mauritanians, but further reducing the country's already limited income.

In addition, Abdallahi's term saw several low level but prominent terrorist attacks. In December of 2007, a French family was gunned down by militants outside Aleg, a small town east of Nouakchott. (AP, BBC, London Times) In early February of 2008, gunmen opened fire on the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott. The first attack resulted in the cancellation of the 2008 Dakar Rally due to security concerns.

These deteriorating conditions culminated in a fresh coup in August, in which General Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz and a team of military officers detained and took power from President Abdallahi and his prime minister, Yahya Ould Ahmed al Waqef. The negative fallout from this coup was immediate. The junta promised elections, but was decisively condemned by the United Nations, the United States, and the European and African Unions. Uneasy about the fallout from the coup, the Israeli government delayed sending a new ambassador to Nouakchott. The AU moved to suspend Mauritanian membership, as the junta left open the possibility that Abdelaziz might run for president in the promised elections. Whether for actual approval, or for fear of reprisal, two thirds of the Mauritanian parliament approved the coup (BBC, Guardian). Prime Minister Waqef was released after several days (AP, BBC), while President Abdallahi remains captive to this day, and has announced that he is not cooperating with the junta as previously reported. Part of the fallout from the coup was that the developed world suspended all non-food aid to the impoverished country in what continues to be an unsuccessful attempt to pressure the coup into returning power to the elected government.

Terrorists often look for opportunities presented by turmoil in weakly controlled countries, particularly those that are ruled by illegitimate governments. During the course of the 2005 coup, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat had yet to formally join al Qaeda or stage many high profile attacks; actual al Qaeda personnel in the Sahara were on the run from the Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans Sahara task force. However, AQIM had consolidated itself sufficiently by late summer of 2008 to challenge the legitimacy of the Mauritanian junta. Less than two weeks after the junta seized power, AQIM issued a call to arms to the people of Mauritania, calling for them to rise up against the junta. This followed statements by General Abdelaziz claiming that defeating the "terrorist menace" was one of his top priorities.

The BBC published an article questioning the extent of Mauritania's terror threat at the end of August. Scarcely three weeks later, al Qaeda terrorists kidnapped and decapitated 12 Mauritanian soldiers outside the mining city of Zouerat. Despite claims by Mauritanian officials that the army would act swiftly to prevent the militants from escaping across the border, the soldiers' bodies were found several days later. Although these militants remain at large, the Mauritanian government claims to have busted an al Qaeda support cell operating in and around Nouakchott.

Many look to General Abdelaziz's past as a harbinger of what his rule might encompass. Abdelaziz was instrumental in protecting President Taya from several coup attempts before helping Colonel Vall to facilitate the August 2005 putsch. While he is widely credited with reducing the previous junta's timeline for democratic transition from two years to nineteen months, he is seen by some as having Nasserist political leanings, similar to those of secular Arab nationalist leaders like Bashar Assad of Syria, Muammar Qaddhafi of Libya, and Saddam Hussein of pre-war Iraq. (This should not be seen as associating him with these leaders, as the extent of his desire to maintain power has yet to be determined.) General Abdelaziz is also perceived to be racially biased, leaving open the possibility for ethnic tension and conflict within the nation.

So, what will the long-term fallout from the coup entail? With the political inability of the United States and other nations to cooperate with the Mauritanian military, OEF-Trans Sahara operations in Mauritania could become more difficult to coordinate and execute. In addition, sanctions by the international community could continue to prevent Mauritania from exploiting its oil resources. With the encroaching Sahara engulfing homes and preventing citizens from developing the land, the coup could very well exacerbate the already poor condition of the Mauritanian populace.

Although many believe that a combination of Islamist sentiment, poverty, and illegitimate governance invariably leads to radicalization and insurgency, Mauritania serves as one of several examples that counter such logic. Although Mauritania has produced a handful of terrorists, most notably Abu Hafs al Mauritani (an advisor to Osama bin Laden and leader of the Mauritanian al Qaeda cell) and El Khadim Ould Esseman (suspected leader of AQIM in Mauritania), Mauritanians have shown themselves to be moderate and dispassionate, bordering on apathetic, with respect to politics. Even the country's Islamists, likely the most extreme religious group in the country, joined Prime Minister Waqef's cabinet despite the Abdallahi government's decision to retain full diplomatic ties with Israel. However, even without a strong militant sentiment in the country, a poorly secured, disunited, and impoverished country could well turn not only into a safe haven for AQIM, but also a more fertile recruiting ground than it is currently. Although AQIM would seem to have its work cut out for it, sporadic and spontaneous changes of government do little to hinder terrorist operations.

Although Mauritania seems unlikely to turn into a mirror of pre-war Afghanistan, any further deterioration of the humanitarian, economic, and security conditions within the country could have far-reaching impacts within and beyond its borders. For these reasons, Mauritania will remain a subject of intense scrutiny by security experts in the West.

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