Tech or Team?
Yahoo reprints an L.A. Times article about Air Force retasking in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's the same biased crap we've come to expect from the L.A. Times, but it raises some issues worth discussing about the future of the military.
The basic premise of the article is that the Air Force has been called upon to re-task personnel into roles as drivers, ground gunners, interpreters, and such. The Air Force says it's temporary; they've spent years trying to carve out a niche as the service that's most dedicated to solving defense problems with technology and "hands-off" solutions. Even so, it's likely that America's national defense needs will require more hands-on solutions, and less hands-off ones. Let's delve a little bit deeper.
There's a paradoxical dilemma when it comes to developing equipment and doctrine for military applications. Planners tend to analyze both the last war, and what they think that the next war is going to entail, and they develop doctrine and technology to try and meet the needs of both. Some services are good at it, some services aren't as good. Let's look at a few examples.
The Army, perhaps the most active branch in Iraq and Afghanistan, decided last year to scrap the Comanche helicopter program, while pushing through with the development of the XM8. In addition, they've continued working to develop the kind of technology we need for the current conflicts: jamming systems, non-lethal crowd control measures, et cetera. (Don't get me started on the Army's new utility uniforms, though.)
The Marine Corps is doing similar work. They're developing new doctrines like Seabasing, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. They've coupled doctrinal changes with the development of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey. There's an incremental increase in technology, but an emphasis on alterations of doctrine and new, efficient applications of existing methods and equipment. The Marine Corps is, bar none, the best service to go to if you're looking for the maximum bang for your buck.
The Navy's made some good attempts as well. They've begun phasing out one of the best pieces of machinery ever made, the tough and versatile F-14 Tomcat, and replaced it with the F/A-18 Hornet, an aircraft slightly better suited to ground support missions that's cheaper in the long run to operate. In terms of actual naval assets, the Navy has developed several vessels that are particularly suited to the current mission. With respect to amphibious support and littoral warfare, which is the primary mission for the Navy these days, there are several major vessels that are either being implemented, or being developed; the most prominent are the High Speed Vessel and the San Antonio class dock ship. With respect to fire support for landings and ground operations, the Navy is developing DD(X) (next generation destroyer), the guided missile/special operations submarine, and Seawolf and Los Angeles class attack submarines (capable of launching Tomahawk missiles). These new and retrofitted vessels and technologies seek to provide for the possibility of combat on the high seas, while simultaneously using the mobile platform of a ship or submarine to facilitate the air support, logistical, and fire support needs of troops on the ground. The investment of money in proven and emerging technologies is designed to meet the needs that are most pressing, and that will likely remain the most pressing.
And the Air Force? Not so much. Whereas the Army eliminated the aforementioned Comanche project, realizing that a fleet of stealth helicopters would be no more effective against Taleban and al Qaeda terrorists and militants than an Apache, or even an old H-34 Choctaw with a couple of door gunners and a few underslung Hellfire missiles, the Air Force has pushed through with development and implementation of the F/A-22 Raptor, as well as a lot of other high-tech gear. The Air Force gets an astonishing budget for technology development, and though some of it goes to worthwhile things (like the next generation bunker-busting munitions), they also seem to spend quite a bit on expensive, impressive, unnecessary technologies that are capable of fighting a war that we can't possibly expect to be faced with any time soon.
Now, don't get me wrong on this one. I understand better than anyone else that if you don't keep up on research and development, and if you cut funding for such R&D, you're shooting yourself in the foot when it comes to fighting your wars in the future. However, we have to be realistic about how that R&D money is being spent. The Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps have done an outstanding job of retasking a Cold War inventory, and transitioning it toward the most likely future conflicts. The Air Force has done a satisfactory job of the retasking, using aircraft designed for air supremacy, interdiction, and interception as ground support platforms; and of course, the Air Force does a wonderful job when it comes to quick movement of lightweight supplies and mid-air refueling. I think, though, that one can say with some degree of indisputability that the very structure and nature of the Air Force is uniquely and solely designed for the Cold War.
If nothing else, it's something worth considering. More on the subject of where the military's going, and where it should be going, as time passes.
The basic premise of the article is that the Air Force has been called upon to re-task personnel into roles as drivers, ground gunners, interpreters, and such. The Air Force says it's temporary; they've spent years trying to carve out a niche as the service that's most dedicated to solving defense problems with technology and "hands-off" solutions. Even so, it's likely that America's national defense needs will require more hands-on solutions, and less hands-off ones. Let's delve a little bit deeper.
There's a paradoxical dilemma when it comes to developing equipment and doctrine for military applications. Planners tend to analyze both the last war, and what they think that the next war is going to entail, and they develop doctrine and technology to try and meet the needs of both. Some services are good at it, some services aren't as good. Let's look at a few examples.
The Army, perhaps the most active branch in Iraq and Afghanistan, decided last year to scrap the Comanche helicopter program, while pushing through with the development of the XM8. In addition, they've continued working to develop the kind of technology we need for the current conflicts: jamming systems, non-lethal crowd control measures, et cetera. (Don't get me started on the Army's new utility uniforms, though.)
The Marine Corps is doing similar work. They're developing new doctrines like Seabasing, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. They've coupled doctrinal changes with the development of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey. There's an incremental increase in technology, but an emphasis on alterations of doctrine and new, efficient applications of existing methods and equipment. The Marine Corps is, bar none, the best service to go to if you're looking for the maximum bang for your buck.
The Navy's made some good attempts as well. They've begun phasing out one of the best pieces of machinery ever made, the tough and versatile F-14 Tomcat, and replaced it with the F/A-18 Hornet, an aircraft slightly better suited to ground support missions that's cheaper in the long run to operate. In terms of actual naval assets, the Navy has developed several vessels that are particularly suited to the current mission. With respect to amphibious support and littoral warfare, which is the primary mission for the Navy these days, there are several major vessels that are either being implemented, or being developed; the most prominent are the High Speed Vessel and the San Antonio class dock ship. With respect to fire support for landings and ground operations, the Navy is developing DD(X) (next generation destroyer), the guided missile/special operations submarine, and Seawolf and Los Angeles class attack submarines (capable of launching Tomahawk missiles). These new and retrofitted vessels and technologies seek to provide for the possibility of combat on the high seas, while simultaneously using the mobile platform of a ship or submarine to facilitate the air support, logistical, and fire support needs of troops on the ground. The investment of money in proven and emerging technologies is designed to meet the needs that are most pressing, and that will likely remain the most pressing.
And the Air Force? Not so much. Whereas the Army eliminated the aforementioned Comanche project, realizing that a fleet of stealth helicopters would be no more effective against Taleban and al Qaeda terrorists and militants than an Apache, or even an old H-34 Choctaw with a couple of door gunners and a few underslung Hellfire missiles, the Air Force has pushed through with development and implementation of the F/A-22 Raptor, as well as a lot of other high-tech gear. The Air Force gets an astonishing budget for technology development, and though some of it goes to worthwhile things (like the next generation bunker-busting munitions), they also seem to spend quite a bit on expensive, impressive, unnecessary technologies that are capable of fighting a war that we can't possibly expect to be faced with any time soon.
Now, don't get me wrong on this one. I understand better than anyone else that if you don't keep up on research and development, and if you cut funding for such R&D, you're shooting yourself in the foot when it comes to fighting your wars in the future. However, we have to be realistic about how that R&D money is being spent. The Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps have done an outstanding job of retasking a Cold War inventory, and transitioning it toward the most likely future conflicts. The Air Force has done a satisfactory job of the retasking, using aircraft designed for air supremacy, interdiction, and interception as ground support platforms; and of course, the Air Force does a wonderful job when it comes to quick movement of lightweight supplies and mid-air refueling. I think, though, that one can say with some degree of indisputability that the very structure and nature of the Air Force is uniquely and solely designed for the Cold War.
If nothing else, it's something worth considering. More on the subject of where the military's going, and where it should be going, as time passes.
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