Revisiting the Challengers of the Islamic Republic

Note: This is my latest submission to my parallel writing endeavour.

One of my first articles for my parallel writing endeavour (Challenging the Islamic Republic, 13 September 2007) introduced readers to two organizations whose sole intent is to challenge the authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The waning days of 2008 offer an excellent opportunity to check in on what these two organizations have been up to this year.

Western media outlets, and their consumers, tend to focus a great deal on America's rivals and allies. As nation after nation withdraws from what is becoming a victorious campaign in Iraq, more emphasis is thrown to Afghanistan, where an eventual victory is less certain. Calendar year 2008, like any year before it, saw a number of important news stories. From political chaos in Thailand, to the international fallout from the expansion and collapse of the oil bubble, to a controversial Russian foray into neighboring Georgia, foreign affairs analysts have had a great deal to keep track of. Through it all, the dispute over Iran's illicit nuclear program has endured. Iran has also been responsible for arming Shia militias in Iraq and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, in addition to somewhat substantiated accusations that Iran has maintained a relationship of some sort with al Qaeda. Iran has, accordingly, been a central player in the international politics of 2008.

Despite Iran's initial success at undermining the allied war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the iron fisted Iranian clerics are not without their own insurgent concerns. Although they operate for different reasons, and with different goals, two major insurgent groups have challenged Iran in recent years. Both groups are poised to finish 2008 on better footing than the Iranian government they live to challenge.

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK/MKO), or as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI, the group's umbrella political organization), was founded prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Their initial movement was based on one of a number of philosophies combining Islamic traditions and Marxist theories to come out of the 1960's. The MEK used widespread discontent over the harsh rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi to recruit operatives, then perpetrated acts of terror against Iranian targets. The MEK was also tied to the assassinations of several American military officers during the 1970's, though they claim that these murders were perpetrated by a splinter group within the organization. The group would eventually split into two organizations: one emphasizing Islam that exists to this day, and the other fully embracing Marxism. Since 1979, the MEK has become persona non grata with the leaders of the Islamic Republic. During a lengthy partnership of convenience with Saddam Hussein, the MEK headquartered itself at Camp Ashraf, an outpost north of Baghdad. In the wake of the 2003 coalition invasion, the MEK were essentially disarmed, and have voluntarily renounced terrorism.

Because of its past, the MEK was designated a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Islamic Republic of Iran - likely one of only a handful of issues that the West and the Iranian government had agreed on following the ouster of the Shah. During the intervening years since 1979, the MEK/NCRI have largely moderated and liberalized their views, and formed a veritable government in exile. Their current philosophy emphasizes the rights and participation of ethnic and religious minorities, transparent democracy, and women's rights. Although the MEK is currently led by Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, Massoud Rajavi has not appeared publicly in several years, leaving his wife to serve as de facto leader. Two thirds of MEK commanders are female, and the organization purports to include members from Iran's ethnic and religious minority groups.

The standards for being added to the terrorist lists of the United States and the European Union are simple: any organization that uses violence for political ends has a good chance of finding itself on the lists. Following its renunciations of terrorism in recent years, analysts and pundits have begun to question whether or not the MEK is still a terrorist group. The MEK themselves seem to agree, and they spent 2008 using the European legal framework in an attempt to get the group removed from these terrorist lists.

In early May, the British government upheld a decision to remove the MEK from a list of banned terrorist organizations. Emboldened by this decision, the MEK kept pushing in various courts, and in various countries. The waning days of June were eventful for the group, as the group was officially legalized in the United Kingdom and held a massive demonstration in France several days later. Following their success in Great Britain, the MEK enjoyed another legal victory in October when a European Union court annulled a previous EU decision to freeze the MEK's funds.

For their part, the Iranian government makes no bones about their hatred of the MEK. The nebulous crimes of the MEK are featured regularly in snipets and asides on the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran's English "Voice of Justice" radio programs. In addition, the semi-official Fars News Agency frequently publishes articles lambasting the West for so-called "double standards in its campaign against terrorism," due to the West's work with the MEK and its affiliates. Fars even went so far as to note Iranian lawmakers' outrage at Maryam Rajavi's recent trip to Germany.

So, what possible importance could a force of no more than four thousand have against the Iranian government? Beyond their ability and willingness to provide intelligence on Iranian nuclear activities to Western agencies, the MEK serves an important political purpose. Their simplest political strength is the voice they provide to Iranians opposed to the mullahs - both those in exile, and those in Iran who are unable to speak out for fear of retribution from the iron fisted government. The MEK also provides a political card to those Western governments engaged in negotiations with Iran. Because the body of the MEK resides in Iraq, and because its leaders have free movement in Europe, the Iranian government has little ability to counter the MEK public relations apparatus. Iran's continuing defiance on both nuclear proliferation and state sponsorship of terrorism issues could leave Western governments poised to afford more and more public recognition to the MEK. And, in the event of an unforeseen collapse of the Islamic Revolution, the MEK/NCRI is the most likely organization to form the core of an interim Iranian government.

Unlike the MEK, Iran's other prominent insurgent concern continues to engage in violent attacks against Iranian government targets. Jundallah (Arabic for "Army of God") is a Baloch nationalist group. The Balochs comprise one of South Asia's largest ethnic groups. Balochistan is similar to Kurdistan: both were divided into multiple parts following various global events of the last two centuries. As a result, the Balochi people find themselves divided in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as ethnic minorities, instead of being a majority in their own unified nation. Jundallah was founded several years ago to address Balochi outrage at the discriminatory policies of the Iranian government. Iran has accused the United States of assisting Jundallah, and although the Iranian media claims that Jundallah is affiliated with al Qaeda, this is unconfirmed by any evidence, and denied by Jundallah leader Abdulmalik Rigi himself.

Jundallah's modus operandi involves infrequent but daring attacks against Iranian government targets, focusing largely on military personnel. The group's most daring attack to date involved a February 2007 VBIED, in which nearly fifty members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps were either killed or injured. A second Jundallah raid occurred several days later, in which insurgents detonated a diversionary percussion bomb before opening fire on and disabling a power station. These attacks occurred in Zahedan, the capital of the Iranian Sistan-Balochistan province.

Jundallah allegedly carried out two attacks in 2008, one of which was successful. In late September, gunmen attempted to kill a public prosecutor in Khash. The gunmen escaped, and the Iranian government blamed Jundallah. Their most successful operation in 2008 began with two raids in June, when Jundallah gunmen abducted a combined total of sixteen Iranian soldiers from checkpoints near Saravan. Jundallah reportedly offered to trade the Iranian soldiers for two hundred imprisoned Jundallah personnel, including Abdulmalik Rigi's own brother, who had been imprisoned in Quetta, Pakistan before being handed over into Iranian custody. One hostage was released, but it is now believed that the remaining fifteen soldiers have been executed by their captors. Iranian diplomats protested what they perceived to be Pakistan's limited cooperation in helping to repatriate the remains of the slain soldiers.

Despite these successes, Iran has done what they could to fight back. In August, Iran executed a journalist who they claimed had ties to Jundallah. Dubai-based al Arabiya TV broadcast an interview with Rigi in mid-October. (video, transcript) Two weeks later, Iran made unconfirmed claims to have seriously wounded Rigi in a skirmish on the Iranian-Pakistani border. This claim follows previous incidents in which the the Iranian government claimed to have killed or wounded Rigi, only to have him pop up days or weeks later.

Like the MEK, Jundallah simply lacks the personnel and supplies to present a large threat to the Iranian government. Beyond that, Jundallah's ultimate goal is not to force the mullahs from power; rather, Abdulmalik Rigi and his subordinates fight for an end to discrimination against Sunni Muslims and ethnic Balochs by the Iranian government. Jundallah's continuing threat to Iran requires the diversion of Iranian security resources to Sistan-Balochistan province. Every successful attack erodes the Iranian military's morale, and also undermines the authority of the Iranian government.

By contrast, 2008 has been a lackluster year for the Iranian government. The media coverage of July's Great Prophet III missile exercise was quickly determined to have included photoshopped images, standing in for Iranian missiles that failed to launch. Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq has also dwindled (BBC, Guardian, AFP), though there are several explanations for this decline that could be valid. What would have been Iran's greatest victory in 2008 has turned into its greatest disaster: oil prices. The leaders of the Islamic Revolution felt exceptionally secure when a barrel of oil cost $140 in July, but they were wholly unprepared for oil to fall to its current price. The government has forecasted a budget based on $45-per-barrel oil prices, but even with Iran and other OPEC nations making record output cuts, the price of oil continues to plummet. This has taken not only a short term toll on Iran's economy, but could also coax Iran's leaders into negotiating more openly in the immediate future.

What will 2009 have in store for the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, Jundallah, and the Islamic Republic? Only time will tell, but no matter what happens, the coming year promises to be an interesting one for all concerned.